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Abstract. Remote attestation protocols are widely used to detect de-
vice configuration (e.g., software and/or data) compromise in Internet
of Things (IoT) scenarios. Unfortunately, the performances of such pro-
tocols are unsatisfactory when dealing with thousands of smart devices.
Recently, researchers are focusing on addressing this limitation. The ap-
proach is to run attestation in a collective way, with the goal of reducing
computation and communication. Despite these advances, current so-
lutions for attestation are still unsatisfactory because of their complex
management and strict assumptions concerning the topology (e.g., being
time invariant or maintaining a fixed topology). In this paper, we propose
PADS, a secure, efficient, and practical protocol for attesting potentially
large networks of smart devices with unstructured or dynamic topologies.
PADS builds upon the recent concept of non-interactive attestation, by
reducing the collective attestation problem into a minimum consensus
one. We compare PADS with a state-of-the art collective attestation
protocol and validate it by using realistic simulations that show prac-
ticality and efficiency. The results confirm the suitability of PADS for
low-end devices, and highly unstructured networks.5
1 Introduction
Smart Internet of Things (IoT) devices are used in many different fields, rang-
ing from simple small scale systems, such as home automation, to large scale
safety-critical environments, e.g., in military systems, drone-based surveillance
systems, factory automation, or smart metering. Unfortunately, their role in crit-
ical systems, their low cost nature, and their wide usage, make IoT devices an
attractive target for attackers [28]. Security in IoT is thus a major concern, to
guarantee both the correct operational capabilities of devices, and prevent data
thefts and/or privacy violations.
Malwares represent a major threat to IoT systems, through which attackers
replace the original firmware from the devices with malicious code, to perform
larger attacks [2,3]. One effective way to detect these types of attacks is remote
5 The paper has been submitted to ESORICS 2018
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2attestation, an interactive protocol between a prover (Prv) and a remote verifier
(Vrf ) that allows Vrf to assess the integrity of Prv ’s configuration (e.g., firmware
and/or data). In a remote attestation protocol, Vrf sends a challenge to Prv ;
Prv computes a measurement (typically a hash) of its configuration, and returns
such measurement to Vrf , integrity and authenticity-protected with a Message
Authentication Code (MAC), or digitally signed. Vrf then checks whether: (i)
the received data is authentic; and (ii) if the received measurement conforms to
an expected “good configuration” (e.g., taken from a database of known “good
configurations”) [18, 19]. As reported in recent alternative solutions, the device
itself can check whether the configuration is correct, and simply report a (signed
or MAC-ed) binary value indicating whether attestation was successful or not [5].
Furthermore, to better match autonomous systems requirements, attestation can
be started by Prv rather than Vrf , at predefined points in time [22]. The security
of remote attestation protocols, in practical settings, is guaranteed by a hybrid
combination of software and hardware [10, 16], which acts as a root of trust for
measurement in the device.
Unfortunately, remote attestation is hard to scale in its basic form. Indeed,
its overhead is linear in the number of provers in a system, making it potentially
unpractical for very large deployments, e.g., networks of autonomous and/or col-
laborating low-end devices. For this reason, in the past years researchers tried to
design novel protocols, called collective attestation protocols, to allow attestation
to scale, while retaining useful security properties [5, 7, 11, 24]. Previous work,
however, focused on networks with mostly static topologies, scaling attestation
over spanning trees, which are difficult and expensive to maintain in networks
with faulty links, and/or dynamic topologies. Examples of this type of settings
are decentralized coordination of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) [13, 30] or
adaptive driverless cars traffic flow management [17,20,31].
Idea and Contribution. In this paper, we propose a novel protocol for effi-
ciently and effectively collect attestation proofs from provers in highly dynamic
networks of autonomous devices. Inspired by the sensor fusion literature [9], we
take a different approach with respect to previous works. We start from the
concept of non-interactive attestation [22], and turn the problem of efficiently
collecting attestation proofs from provers, into a distributed consensus problem:
A network of agents (i.e., provers) attest themselves (as in [22]), and then cor-
roborate their individual results into a “fused” attestation result via minimum
consensus. The final collective result will carry sufficient information to tell which
devices in the network are in an healthy state, i.e., run a correct version of the
firmware, and which are compromised. Our solution perfectly fits with networks
of autonomous devices that operate without a central unit coordinating the op-
eration.
We achieve this goal through PADS, the first protocol that supports attesta-
tion on highly dynamic and unstructured networks. PADS presents several key
advantages w.r.t. existing literature:
3– It does not require the establishment of an overlay spanning tree to efficiently
carry out the collective attestation process, and as such, it is suitable for
unstructured networks;
– It does not require provers to be always online and/or reachable during the
whole attestation process;
– It is computationally efficient and suitable for resource-constrained devices,
and protocols;
– As in [22], PADS starts at (and produces an attestation result related to)
given points in time, and the verifier can at any time obtain the status of
the network by querying any prover in the network;
– It opens for intelligent uses of attestation results, e.g., healthy nodes can
know the status of other nodes and exclude compromised nodes from com-
putation.
We show the performance of PADS through simulations, and compare it
against SANA [5]. Our experimental results confirm the suitability of PADS for
low-end devices, and highly unstructured networks.
2 Related Work
Asokan et al. [7] first highlighted the challenges in remote attestation for large
swarms of low-end devices, and proposed SEDA, a scalable protocol for col-
lective attestation. SEDA allows Vrf to perform attestation over an (overlay)
spanning tree, rooted at Vrf ; each device attests its neighbors, and reports back
to its parent (in the spanning tree). Each device in SEDA is equipped with the
minimal hardware requirements necessary for attestation on embedded devices,
i.e., a Read-Only Memory (ROM), and a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) [18].
SEDA provides an efficient mechanism to perform attestation, but requires full
connectivity among nodes during the whole attestation process. DARPA [21]
improves the resiliency of SEDA against strong attackers, by allowing nodes to
collaboratively detect hardware-compromised devices. Unfortunately, DARPA
inherits most of the main limitations of SEDA when it comes to dynamic net-
works. Ambrosin et al. [5] proposed SANA, an end-to-end secure protocol for
collective attestation that, compared to SEDA, limits the strength of hardware
attacks, is publicly verifiable, and does not require all the nodes in the system to
be equipped with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), making it usable in
heterogeneous deployments. SANA allows untrusted nodes to aggregate attesta-
tion proofs collected from provers, using a generalized aggregate multi-signature
scheme. While resolving most of the major shortcomings of SEDA, SANA still
requires full connectivity among devices; moreover, it introduces severe overhead
on low-end provers. More recently, [11] propose two remote attestation proto-
cols that improve SEDA with respect to scalability and resiliency to hardware
attacks. However, [11] requires full connectivity among devices for the whole
attestation process. Remarkably, the recent work in [24] improves SEDA by sup-
porting more dynamic networks, at the price, however of additional complexity
in the system (election of clustered nodes, etc.). More recently, Ibrahim et al.
4proposed SeED [22], a protocol that allows to perform a prover-initiated series of
attestation step at different random points in time. This represents a good fit for
several applications, and in dynamic networks. Unfortunately, SeED leverages
SEDA to scale to collective attestation, and thus inherits its limitations. More
recently, Carpent et al. [12] proposed ERASMUS, a remote attestation protocol
for unattended devices which unlike other RA schemes promises to identify mo-
bile adversaries between two successive attestation periods. Although it substan-
tially minimizes prover’s computation but [12] leverages SEDA or LISA [7, 11]
for collective attestation of swarms. Thus inherits their shortcomings.
3 System Model and Assumptions
3.1 System Model
We consider a network G modeled as a graph with vertices V and edges E
of interconnected (possibly low-power) devices. The number of edges in G is
static, with |V | = n; however, the topology of the network is highly dynamic,
i.e., E may vary over time. To make this explicit, we denote with Et the set
of edges in E at time instant t. In a similar way, we use subscripts from a set
of time instants with all other variables that range over time. We further indi-
cate with Ni,t the set of all the vertex neighbors of a vertex i, at time t, i.e.,
Ni,t = {j ∈ V | ∃ e ∈ Et s.t., e connects i and j}. From a communication
standpoint, a device (i.e., a vertex) could be either unresponsive, or inactive.
An unresponsive device is a device with which communications have been inter-
rupted for some reason, for example, intentionally or for physical causes, e.g.,
the connection experienced interference. An inactive device is a device which
does not participate in any communication with other devices, e.g., an isolated
device in the network. A device is active or responsive if it is not inactive and
we denote with Rt the set of devices that are responsive at time instant t.
Similarly to previous works in this area [5,7], we define a collective attestation
protocol as a protocol between the following entities: prover (Prv), and verifier
(Vrf ). Each vertex in G is a prover Prv i, and thus, in the remaining of the paper,
we will use Prv i to refer to vertex i in G. We assume the existence of at least one
verifier Vrf , which is not part of G. As shown in Fig. 1, Vrf can communicate
only with the provers that are in its communication range, as well as responsive,
at a certain point in time t.
3.2 Security Model
Prover Capability Requirements and Assumptions. In line with all the
previous works in swarm attestation [5, 7, 11, 21], and in particular according
to very recent works on non-interactive attestation [22], we assume each device
presents the following minimal features: (i) A Read-Only Memory (ROM), where
integrity-protected attestation code should reside; (ii) A Memory Protection Unit
(MPU), that allows to enforce access control on areas of the memory, e.g., read-
only access to certain memory areas exclusively to attestation protocol code [18];
5Fig. 1: Target system model for PADS. Provers communicate wirelessly with
entities withing their wireless coverage, and are mobile; as such, at different
points in time, the topology may change (t and t+∆t in the picture). Similarly,
the verifier can communicate with any prover in its wireless coverage.
(iii) A secure Real-Time Clock (RTC) [21], to tie the generation of the attestation
proof to the current time; and (iv) A secure attestation trigger (AT) [22], i.e.,
a dedicated circuit that should be non-interruptible by the operating system
running on the device.
Existing popular designs for embedded devices, such as SMART [16],
TrustLite [23], or TyTAN [10], natively provide ROM and MPU capabilities,
and have been used in most (if not all) previous works as reference architec-
tures. The latter two features, RTC and AT, are provided by additional (yet
minimal) dedicated hardware components, as shown in [22].
Device Classification. From a security standpoint, in line with previous works,
we classify a device with a provably correct (i.e., attestable) configuration as
healthy ; in case the configuration is not correct, we classify the device as com-
promised.
However, as we deal with very dynamic networks, i.e., where G over time may
be a disconnected graph, Vrf could not be able to always determine the status of
a device as healthy or compromised. On one hand, while healthy nodes usually
are assumed to correctly follow the attestation protocol, it may happen that they
do not reply to communication requests from other devices because inactive,
e.g., they are busy, or decide to turn into an idle state to save battery during
inactivity, or unresponsive for physical causes (e.g., a prover device moving out
of range during a communication). On the other hand, a compromised prover
may refuse to respond to try to evade detection. As a consequence, considering
an unresponsive or inactive prover as compromised is, in principle, a wrong
conclusion. From a communication perspective, we refer to provers that cannot
be reached over the whole duration of the attestation protocol as unreachable,
while we refer to provers that at least at one point in time take part in the
protocol as reachable.
Given the above, from a security perspective we consider three possible out-
comes of the attestation process, for a prover: Healthy, which means that the de-
6vice is reachable, and has a correct configuration; Compromised, which means
that device is reachable, but the running software configuration is incorrect; Un-
known, which means that the device was unreachable, and thus not “covered”
by the attestation protocol.
Adversary Model. We consider the following types of adversary:
– Communication Adversary (Advcom): Conforms to the Dolev-Yao
model [15]. Advcom is assumed to be fully in control of the commu-
nication channel between provers, and between provers and Vrf . This
adversary can perform several types of attacks: (i) drop attestation reports
from provers; (ii) replay attestation reports from provers, e.g., replay correct
attestation reports even after a device is compromised; (iii) forge attestation
reports from provers to change their value.
– Software Adversary (Adv soft): A purely software adversary can exploit vul-
nerabilities in provers’ software, e.g., to remotely inject malware (i.e., modify
existing code, introduce new malicious code, or read unprotected memory
locations). Adv soft may adopt several strategies to remain undetected, such
as: (i) Modify the code responsible for attestation inside the prover; (ii) Ex-
tract Prv ’s security parameters; and (iii) Manipulate Prv ’s clock to trigger
future correct measurements of current software [22].
– Mobile Software Adversary (Advmob): It is a software adversary that tries
to evade detection by “physically moving”. As an example, compromised
provers can keep sufficient distance from other provers to remain “unde-
tected” by other approaching devices.
Finally, similarly to previous work in the area, we consider both physical
adversaries and DoS attacks on provers out of the scope of this work.
Key Management. Key management has been studied extensively over the
past years in several fields, e.g., in the context of Wireless Sensor Networks and
Internet of Things (the reader may refer to [33] for a comprehensive survey of
main approaches). While several previously proposed schemes may be adopted
in our design, for the sake of simplicity we consider two main options: (1) enable
the use of a na¨ıve master key katt shared by all the n devices in G, and kept
in a hardware-protected key storage, similar to [11]; or (2) adopt individual
public/private key pair (and certificate) for each device, in order to allow message
authentication or to exchange pair-wise symmetric keys. The choice here, as
suggested in [11], depends on the type of adversary from which the scheme wants
to protect against: indeed, it is clear that a shared master key would not mitigate
an hardware attacker, while the use of (2) would limit the impact of an hardware
compromise, at the price, however, of an higher cost in terms of performance.6
Both options are valid, and the decision should be made depending on the trade-
off between performance and security. In what follows, we target software-only
attackers and, for ease of exposition, similarly to [11], we consider the symmetric
case (1) to describe and evaluate PADS. Appendix A briefly discusses potential
consequences of having a stronger adversary in the system.
6 ECDSA signature generation can take a thousand time more compared to a SHA-1
based MAC, to be computed on a resource-constrained platform [7].
7Requirements. We consider the following requirements for a secure non-
interactive collective attestation in a highly dynamic environment:
– Resiliency. The protocol must be resilient to cases where nodes mobility
causes failures in (and consequent modifications to) the communication links
between devices.
– Efficiency. The lack of a topology makes collective attestation harder; nev-
ertheless, the protocol should be efficient for large scale network of resource-
constrained devices.
– Heterogeneity. The collective attestation protocol shall support an heteroge-
neous population of devices, with different configurations.
– Unforgeability. The collective attestation protocol shall guarantee that no
software compromised device can forge an attestation result.
– Low complexity. The collective attestation protocol should not require com-
plex network and/or routing management.
4 Preliminaries and Notation
4.1 Minimum consensus
In this paper we rely on the minimum consensus protocol [26] to share attes-
tation results among provers, and iteratively converge to a “snapshot” of the
status of the network. Vrf can obtain the collective status of the network by
query any prover in G. Consensus algorithms have been proposed to overcome
the necessity of distributed and fault-tolerant computation and information ex-
change algorithms. These protocols perfectly fit the constrains of networks char-
acterized by: (i) no centralized entity coordinating computation, communication
and time-synchronization, (ii) topology not completely known to the nodes of
the network, and (iii) limited computational power and energy resources [9].
Consensus algorithms have wide application in wireless sensor networks [25,26],
unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) coordination [27], swarm flocking [8], and many
other application scenarios attributable to IoT.
Of particular interest for our work are asynchronous consensus proto-
cols [25,26], where nodes periodically broadcast their status to neighbors within
their connectivity radius. In practice, any node receives information by the
neighborhood, updates his status7 and shares the new state to his neighbors.
By having each node iterating such step multiple times, the state of all the
network nodes converges to the same consensus. The minimum consensus pro-
tocol [26] we are using in PADS distributively computes the minimum of the
observations (attestation) provided by the nodes of the network. The input se-
quence of the minimum consensus protocol is represented by the sequence x0
= (x01, x
0
2, . . . , x
0
n), representing the inputs of the n nodes in the network.
According to [25], given x0, the protocol generates a sequence of observation
states {xt}inft=0 and in the step t any node i of the network updates its status by
7 There is no need for a real update synchronization among the nodes.
8Table 1: Notation.
Entities
Gt = (Et, Vt) Network of provers at time t, with edges Et and vertices Vt.
Prv , Vrf Prover and verifier, respectively.
Ni,t Neighbors of prover Prv i at time t, in Gt.
Rt Set of active and responsive provers at time t.
Parameters
n Size of the network, i.e., number of provers in G.
katt Symmetric attestation key shared among provers in V .
Tatt Time at which an attestation is performed.
∆Tmax Maximum time interval between two consecutive attestation runs.
ν PRNG secret seed, shared among provers.
ri,t Attestation result of Prv i at time t.
xti Observation of network’s (attestation) status from Prv i at time t,
in the form of a bitmask of 2× n bits.
xti[j] j-th bits couple in x
t
i representing the status of j-th prover in G.
computing xt+1i = minj∈Ni∪{i}x
t
j , where Ni is the set of neighbors of the node
i (more details are provided in Section 5).
Finally, previous research works [14, 32] showed that distributed consensus
protocols converge in a finite amount of time (i.e., steps), whose upper bound
depends on the structure of the graph.
4.2 Notation
Table 1 introduces the notation we will use in this paper. Let {0, 1}` represent
the set of all bit strings of length `. We use ←R M to represent a uniformly
random sampling from a set M , and with |M | the cardinality of a set M . PADS
security relies on message authentication code (MAC), and pseudo-random num-
ber generator (PRNG).
A MAC is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (mac keygen,
mac, mac verif). mac keygen takes as input a security parameter 1`mac , and out-
puts a symmetric key k; σ ← mack(m) and mac verifk(σ,m) ∈ {1, 0} are,
respectively, the computation of a MAC on a message m using a key k, and the
verification of the MAC σ computed on a message m using key k (1 = valid
MAC, 0 otherwise).
A PRNG is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm prng gen. prng gen
takes as input the previous state µt−1 (at time t − 1), and outputs a
(pseudo-)random value θt ∈ {0, 1}`θ , as well as its current state µt.
95 PADS: Efficient Attestation
5.1 Protocol Rationale and Overview
The goal of PADS is to cope with settings with a high mobility degree. To this
end, PADS achieves network attestation by corroborating individual attestation
reports from devices, via consensus.
At a high-level, PADS works as follows. At the same point in time Tatt ,
each prover Prv i performs a local self-attestation step, checking whether its
software configuration (i.e., its measurement h) corresponds to a known “good
configuration”; this is achieved by matching it against a list of pre-installed, and
thus static, configurations H (similar to [5]). If the configuration is “good”, i.e.,
h ∈ H, Prv i’s local attestation procedure outputs ri = 1, and ri = 0 otherwise.
Minimum consensus is used to spread the knowledge about each node state
through the network. In order to let Vrf to obtain a “snapshot” of the status
of the network from any prover, we let each prover maintain the status of the
whole network, and update it iteratively. To ease an hardware implementation
(see Section 5.2 for the details), we represent the three attestation outcomes
introduced in Section 3.2 using the following 2 bits values:
– Compromised (00): responsive compromised prover.
– Healthy (10): responsive healthy prover.
– Unknown (11): healthy or compromised prover that is unreachable.
It follows that, from a consensus perspective, an observation for a prover
Prv i x
t
i is a bitmask of 2 × n bits, reporting attestation information for the
whole network G. We indicate with xti[j], the attestation information relative to
prover j in G, i.e., the j-th pair of bits in xti.
When the consensus protocol starts after attestation, a prover Prv i has only
knowledge about its attestation outcome ri, and thus sets x
0
i [i] = ri ∈ {00, 10};
having no knowledge on the state of other devices yet, the remaining pairs of
bits in x0i are set to 11, i.e., to represent the “unknown” state. In subsequent
steps, provers exchange and combine their observations through the consensus
algorithm, this way iteratively building a unique “view” of the status of the
network. During a generic step t any node i broadcasts its (MAC-ed) observation
xti about the network and receives (MAC-ed) observations x
t
j from active devices
j ∈ Ni,t8. Note that, a compromised device transmitting a fake message can be
identified from a wrong MAC (recall that, as stated in Section 3.2, the MPU
in the device can prevent access to the memory area where k resided); minatt
combines the observations of Prv i and the received observations from Prv j as:
xt+1i = minatt(x
t
i, {xtj}Prvj∈Ni,t∩Rt) = x; (1)
x, s.t., x[l] = min(xti[l], {xtj [l]}Prvj∈Ni,t∩Rt), l = 0, ..., n.
Similarly other nodes update their status. Note that, if we restrict the set of
possible values for every xti[j] to {00, 10, 11}, Eq. 1 can be efficiently computed
using the AND operator.
8 Synchronization among devices is not really needed in the protocol and has been
introduced for simplicity.
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else
katt , x
t
i, H = {h1, . . . , hM} katt , xt′j , H = {h1, . . . , hM}
Prv i Prv j ∈ Ni,t ∩Rt
Self-attestation (selfAtt)
Consensus (cons)
{θt, µt} ← prng gen(µt−1)
Tatt ← Tatt + (θt mod ∆Tmax )
schedule(Tatt)
h← getSoftConf()
if h ∈ H then
x0i [i]← {00}
x0i [i]← {10}
xti ← {11}n
T˜ ← timestamp()
σ ← mackatt (xtj || T˜ || Tatt)
[ xtj , T˜ , Tatt , σ ]
if mac verifkatt (σ, x
t
j || T˜ || Tatt) ∧ Tatt −∆T < T˜ < Tatt + ∆T then
xt+1i ← minAtt(xtj , xti)
end if
end if
// Every time t
Fig. 2: PADS’s selfAtt and cons procedures shown for a single reachable prover
Prv j .
In order to guarantee the correctness of the consensus results, the value of
xti is stored in a access-restricted area of Prv i, protected by MPU inside the
device; furthermore, messages are integrity protected by a MAC computed using
a common key katt shared by all devices, and secured in an read/write protected
area of the memory. Repeating updates using the consensus algorithm through
all the network spreads this information to all nodes in G.
Finally, in order to obtain the status of the network, Vrf queries any device
Prv i in G; if the latter is not compromised (Vrf verifies this by asking ri,t from
Prv i), it will return the consensus state representing its knowledge about each
node. This allows Vrf to obtain an immediate approximation of the status of the
network, limited by some uncertainty; such uncertainty derives from provers not
replying, and/or information that has not yet reached the node. We underline
that Vrf can query a Prv anytime during the protocol. However closer is the
query to Tatt , highest is the uncertainty.
5.2 Protocol Details
PADS comprises four phases: initialization, self-attestation, consensus, and ver-
ification (the latter two shown in Fig. 2).
Initialization. Similar to [11], we assume for simplicity that nodes in the net-
work are pre-provisioned with a shared symmetric key katt . As discussed in [11],
this is sufficient in a software-only adversarial setting. Furthermore, we assume
each prover is provisioned with the set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hM} of known good
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configurations (i.e., hash values); this list is either assumed to be static, or in-
frequently securely updated. Finally, as in [22], provers are provisioned with a
shared secret seed νatt that they will use to autonomously calculate a pseudo-
random sequence of attestation times. Alternatively, the whole sequence of at-
testation times may be securely stored inside the device, at the price however,
of a larger memory occupation.
Self-attestation. The next attestation procedure is performed at a certain
point in time Tatt , which is computed by device’s secure clock using the func-
tion prng gen, and triggered by secure clock’s function schedule. Each prover
Prv i executes a self-attestation procedure. This procedure is similar to the one
in [22], but with a major difference: Prv i measures its configuration producing
a measurement value h, but instead of sending h to Vrf , it performs a “self-
assessment”. More precisely, at time Tatt each Prv i computes the hash h of a
predefined area of the memory – getSoftConf9. As in [5], this result is then
checked against the (set of) good configuration(s) H, pre-stored inside the de-
vice, using the check function. The result of this operation is ri ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., 1
if the configuration is a good one, and 0 otherwise. Prv i further sets x
0
i [i] = 10
if ri,t = 1, and x
0
i [i] = 00 otherwise.
Consensus. In this phase, provers corroborate their “observations” of the sta-
tus of the network, using the distributed minimum consensus introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1. The goal is to jointly converge to the same “view” of the network,
represented as a bitmask. To do that, periodically each prover Prv i broadcasts
its observation, i.e., xti at time t; this is the bitmask representing a snapshot of
the status of the network, together with a timestamp T˜ , and a MAC σ taken
over xti, T˜ , and Tatt . Every other prover Prv j receiving a (broadcast) message,
verifies the MAC σ– mac verif, checks whether T˜ resides within a valid time
interval (to prevent reply attacks), and finally performs the minimum consensus
calculus according to Eq. 1.
Verification. Vrf collects the final network status xt, i.e., the result of the
collective attestation protocol, from a prover Prv i, randomly chosen from G.
Vrf executes this final step in any moment after a “reasonable” amount of time
TMAX, which can be estimated by Vrf , or simply fixed. Furthermore, the choice
of Prv i may be dictated by physical conditions, e.g., Prv i is in proximity of
Vrf . The final verification step is as simple as listening the message broadcasted
by Prv i, verifying the MAC σ on it (using mac verif), and check whether T˜
resides within a valid time interval (i.e., within the range [Tatt −∆T, TMAX]).
If any of the above checks fail, Vrf outputs rVrf = 0, i.e., the result of the
collective attestation process rVrf is 0; otherwise, Vrf will output rVrf = 1, and
the representativity value ρ, and records all the goods and compromised devices.
9 The part of the memory measured during attestation can vary, and depends from
the specific applicative scenario.
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5.3 Security of PADS
We now discuss the security of PADS against the adversary model introduced
in Section 3.2. In a collective attestation protocol, the goal of a local and/or
remote adversary Adv is to modify the configuration (e.g., firmware and/or data)
of one or more provers Prv , and evade detection from the verifier Vrf . This can
be formalized as a security experiment ExpAdv , where Adv interacts with Prv
and Vrf during the execution of the protocol. After a polynomial number of
steps in `mac, `prng gen, Vrf outputs (r,ρ), where r is the attestation result (r = 1
if it accepts attestation result, otherwise r = 0) and ρ is a measure of the quality
of the fetched attestation result. We define the result of the experiment as the
output of Vrf , i.e., ExpAdv = (r, ρ).
We consider a collective attestation protocol for dynamic networks to be se-
cure, if Pr(r = 1|ExpAdv (1`) = r) is negligible in ` = g(`mac, `prng gen), with g
polynomial in `mac, `prng gen. In other words, a collective attestation protocol for
dynamic networks is considered secure if it is computationally infeasible for a
(polynomial) attacker to induce Vrf to accept a fake attestation result. It follows
that PADS is a secure collective attestation protocol for dynamic networks, if:
(1) the MAC, e.g., a Hash-based MAC (HMAC), in use is selective forgery resis-
tant, and (2) the adopted pseudo-random number generator is cryptographically
secure. PADS adopts SeED [22] to perform self-attestation at pseudo-random
points in time; as such, we refer the reader to [22] for a proof of the security of
self-attestation scheme, and we use it as a building block in our security discus-
sion.
In what follows, we will focus on the consensus part of the protocol, and dis-
cuss the security of PADS w.r.t. a communication adversary Advcom , a software
adversary Adv soft , and a mobile adversary Advmob .
– Communication Adversary (Advcom). Advcom can try to either forge a mes-
sage exchanged among provers, or the ones exchanged among a prover and
Vrf , or try to “reuse” an old good attestation message. Both attacks will fail,
since: (i) the probability for Vrf , or a prover Prv to accept a message with a
forged MAC is negligible in `mac; and (ii) each attestation message contains
both the time of attestation Tatt , and a timestamp T˜ , which guarantee the
freshness of the received message.
– Software Adversary (Adv soft). A purely software (remote) adversary Adv soft
may attempt the following attack strategies to remain undetected: (i) Mod-
ify the code responsible for attestation inside the prover; (ii) Extract Prv ’s
security parameters; and (iii) Manipulate Prv ’s clock to trigger future cor-
rect measurements of current software [22]. These attacks have been proven
infeasible for a polynomial attacker in [22]. Furthermore, similarly to self-
attestation, consensus operations are performed by a piece of code protected
by secure boot.
– Mobile Software Adversary (Advmob) Assume at time t a mobile (software-
only) adversary Advmob compromises a prover Prv j before the next attes-
tation time Tatt , and tries to avoid detection by simply not taking part to
the protocol, e.g., physically move out of the communication range of other
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Fig. 3: Implementation of PADS based on SeED [22] and TrustLite [23].
provers in G. As a result, no prover in G will modify the part of the bitmask
related to the compromised prover, xtj [j], whose value will remain 11; this
information will not affect the decision of Vrf , who may decide, adopting a
conservative approach, to consider Prv j as compromised.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
We base our evaluation of PADS on SeED [22], a recently proposed protocol
for devices self-attestation. Fig. 3 shows the implementation design of PADS on
top of the enhanced version of TrustLite [23] used in [22]. SeED [22] extends
TrustLite with a Real-Time Clock (RTC) that is not modifiable via software
(i.e., that is write protected), and an Attestation Trigger (AT) that updates and
monitors the value of a timer stored in a secure register.
We quantify PADS performance based on runtime, energy consumption, and
memory overhead. Furthermore, we evaluate the ability for PADS to “cover”
a sufficiently wide area of the “reachable” provers population, within a certain
time t, using the following notion of coverage:
Definition 1 (Coverage). We say that at time t PADS has coverage ctX = Y ,
if at least a portion X ∈ [0, 1] of the provers in G hold information of at least a
portion Y ∈ [0, 1] of the reachable provers population.
As an example, in a network of 100 provers, where 10% of them are un-
reachable, ct80 = 90% means that 80% of the 90 reachable provers in G hold
information about the 90% of them. Intuitively, the higher the level of coverage,
the higher the number of update steps that are required. This has clearly an
impact in the performance of the protocol, that we estimate and present in the
following. As in [7], in our evaluation we consider a SHA-1 based HMAC.
Memory Overhead. In a shared key setting, i.e., all the provers share the same
symmetric key katt for attestation, the required memory overhead for PADS
depends on `katt , the number of allowed configurations in H, and the size of the
bitmask, which grows linearly with the number of provers n. Overall, let M =
|H|, and considering each element of H of 20 B, regardless from the coverage,
we can quantify the memory overhead of PADS as `katt + 2× n+ 160 ∗ |H| bits.
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Communication Overhead. During PADS’s consensus phase, each prover
Prv i transmits (and/or receives), at every time t: its bitmask x
t
i (2×n bits), the
attestation time Tatt (32 bits) , the timestamp T˜ (32 bits), and one HMAC (160
bits). In total: 2 × n + 224 bits. Clearly, depending on the underlying layer 2
protocol and the size of the network, we may have more or less fragmentation of
the transmitted data. In low-power settings, it is desirable to limit the number
of transmitted frames, and thus, the “maximum” size of the network that PADS
can serve depends on the payload size offered by the underlying layer 2 protocol.
Energy Consumption. We base our estimation of the overall energy consump-
tion on the required energy for sending and receiving a single PADS message,
and to compute the main cryptographic operations. Let Esend , Erecv , Ehmac , Emin
and Eatt denote, respectively, the energy required to send a byte, receive a byte,
calculate one HMAC, calculate the minimum consensus over the received bit-
mask, and perform self-attestation. Recall that, at each round t each prover Prv i
sends: the bitmask xti, the attestation time Tatt , a timestamp T˜ , and one HMAC.
Thus, we can estimate the energy consumption for sending and receiving a single
PADS message for Prv i as:
EPrvisend ≤ Esend × (28 +
2× n
8
); EPrvirecv ≤ Erecv × (28 +
2× n
8
).
Let m be the number of rounds of consensus required by the protocol. To pro-
vide an overall estimate of the energy required by PADS, without loss of general-
ity we assume each prover shares its bitmask at fixed time intervals t1, t2, . . . , tm.
Recall that Ni,t is the set of neighbors of prover Prv i at time t. At each time
t, a prover Prv i computes an HMAC, broadcasts a packet, receives a number of
broadcast messages from its neighbors Ni,t, and verifies the HMAC associated
with them. We estimate the energy required by PADS for a prover Prv i as:
EPrviPADS ≤ Tatt +
tm∑
t=t1
Ehmac + EPrvisend + (Ehmac + EPrvirecv ) ∗ |Ni,t ∩Rt|.
Runtime. Similar to previous works, we evaluated PADS’s runtime using Om-
net++ [4], and the MiXiM [1] framework (for realistic communication protocol
simulation and mobility). We considered networks of medium-large sizes, from
128 to 16,384. In our simulation we consider provers to have specifications com-
parable to the one in [22], and thus used their reported micro-benchmarks as
parameters of our simulation. All the communications are carried out over the
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer protocol, the de-facto standard protocol for IoT [5–7].
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol provides a maximum data rate of 250 Kbps, a max-
imum coverage of 75 m, and a frame size of 127 B. We investigated the perfor-
mance of PADS in two scenarios: (1) A scenario where provers move following
a random path. To model provers mobility, we randomly deployed provers over
a simulated area of size proportional to the number of devices (e.g., simulat-
ing an area covered by a swarm of drones), starting from 1, 000× 1, 000 m2 for
128 provers. The random movement of provers makes the network dynamic and
loosely connected. (2) A static scenario, as considered in previous work, where
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provers are organized in three topologies of various branching factor; in this
setting, we compare the runtime of PADS w.r.t. SANA [5].
Before presenting our results, in order to measure the runtime of PADS we
define the notion of Minimum Coverage Time (MCT):
Definition 2 (Min Coverage Time). The Minimum Coverage Time (MCT)
for PADS, given a desired coverage level ctX = Y , is the minimum amount of
time t necessary to reach ctX . Formally: arg mint c
t
X = Y.
We measured the runtime of PADS as the average MCT. We used delays to
simulate provers’ internal operations, according to [7] and [22]. We considered
48 ms as the time it takes to compute both a hash, and an HMAC [7]. Fur-
thermore, for every generated attestation response, the overhead introduced by
the self attestation part of PADS is 187 ms [22]. This is approximated by the
generation of 32 random bits, and the calculation of a hash over the amount of
memory to be attested. Note that, different from [22], we do not compute an
HMAC on the measurement, as the measurement is not sent to the verifier, but
checked locally; thus, our evaluation is conservative.
For different levels of coverage, we measured the average time for that cover-
age to be reached (average of 50 runs), considering network of small-large sizes,
from 128 to 8,196 devices; we adopted a static rate for broadcasting the bitmask,
i.e., 500 ms. Furthermore, we considered all the provers, either good or compro-
mised, to participate to the attestation process. Results are presented in Fig. 4.
As we can see from Fig. 4a, PADS can reach, on average, 95% of coverage for the
95% of the population (i.e., ct95 = 95) with a MCT lower than 70 seconds, for
populations of 8,196 devices. Furthermore, as indicated in Fig. 4b, the coverage
grows more than linearly over time (shown for ct95 and n = 8196 in Fig. 4b).
In a completely dynamic setting, PADS runtime shows a non-negligible
growth. This is mainly due not only to the increase of the population, but also
on the amount of data to be transmitted (which grows linearly in the number
of provers). Despite this growth, PADS presents a remarkably manageable over-
head for large networks, which makes it a good match for practical applications.
Furthermore, we stress that, while previous work would have failed completing
the attestation process due to the high degree of mobility of this scenario, PADS
allows to complete the attestation process.
We further compare PADS with SANA [5], a recently proposed collective
attestation scheme, which outperformed previous work in the literature. We run
both protocols on static tree topologies of branching factor (br) 2 and 3, using
for PADS a broadcast frequency of 100 ms. Results are shown in Fig. 5. As we
can see, PADS has a lower runtime (i.e., MTC) compared to SANA, mainly due
to the more lightweight cryptography involved. Furthermore, we can see how
the runtime of PADS diminishes with the branching factor of the tree topology.
This confirms the low overhead of our protocol, even for large networks of more
than 16,000 devices. We finally remind that the time necessary for verifier to
obtain the final attestation results in PADS is the time necessary for querying
a single device; that is, the collection of the final result is separate from the
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Fig. 4: Evaluation of PADS in mobile wireless setting, varying number of provers
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of ct95; Fig. 4b shows the relation between c
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Fig. 5: Runtime of PADS vs SANA [5], varying number of nodes and ctX , with
X = 95%. We considered up to 50 different configurations, and 60% compro-
mised provers.
collection and agregation of the single attestation proofs. In SANA, instead, the
attestation protocol starts after the verifier queries the first node; in this case,
Vrf has to wait until the protocol is concluded.
7 Conclusions
This paper presented PADS, an efficient, practical, and secure protocol for at-
testing potentially large and highly dynamic networks of resource-constrained
autonomous devices. PADS overcomes the limitations of previous works in the
literature on collective attestation; it uses the recently proposed concept of self
attestation, and turns the collective attestation problem into a minimum con-
sensus one. We showed the performance of PADS via realistic simulations, in
terms of devices capabilities and communication protocol, confirming both the
practicality and efficiency of PADS.
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As a future work, we will investigate ways to reduce the complexity of the
protocol in terms of both communication and required processing for devices; we
will explore the use of Bloom Filters as a way to reduce the size of the payload,
as well as adopting more intelligent techniques to selectively pick messages to use
for consensus; we will modify the protocol to manage nodes joining (or leaving)
the network after the initial setup.
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A Discussion
Advantages. The first and probably most important advantage that PADS has
w.r.t. previous works, is that is suitable for highly dynamic, mobile unstruc-
tured topologies, as confirmed by our evaluation. The use of consensus makes
the whole proliferation of the attestation results resilient to both temporary de-
vice disconnections, and topology changes. Most of the previous works in the
area were designed for static topologies, over which a spanning tree should be
maintained, with non-negligible overhead; as such, they would most certainly
fail in this scenario [5,7,11,21,22]; one exception is the work in [24], which pro-
vides adaptability to changes in the topology, at the price, however, of a complex
topology maintenance.
The second main advantage of PADS, is the capability of the verifier to
obtain the status of the population by simply contacting a random prover. This,
again, makes PADS very resilient against node failures or sudden changes in the
topology. This is due to the fact that the whole status of the network is shared
among every prover; furthermore, a verifier has the ability to query a device for
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the status of the network at any point in time, being assured that this would
return a valid attestation result, with a utility (i.e., a coverage) dependent on
the status of the protocol.
Finally, while growing more than linearly in the number of devices (mostly
because the amount of information that each prover must exchange grows lin-
early in the number of nodes in the system), the overhead introduced by PADS
is manageable in resource-constrained environments, as showed by our simula-
tions in Section 6; furthermore, in the same (static) setting as previous work,
PADS shows comparable if not superior performance w.r.t. the state of the art.
This makes PADS a good candidate for attestation in scenarios where other ex-
act methods would fail, e.g., swarms of drones for surveillance. We stress that
PADS for the first time enables swarm attestation in dynamic topologies of
autonomous devices, while previous protocols works only on static networks.
Therefore, by design, PADS trades scalability for adaptability and resiliency in
dynamic scenarios.
Limitations. While PADS brings numerous advantages w.r.t. the state of the
art, we are conscious that network dynamics is not network security’s friend,
and we acknowledge that PADS is not perfect.
First, the final consensus is a representation of the status of the devices
composing the network at the time the last attestation has been triggered by
the device’s secure clock. Therefore, a device compromised after such timestamp
can remain undetected10. Unfortunately, this is a well known limitation of most
attestation protocols, commonly defined as “time of check to time of use” [29].
Finally PADS aligns with previous works that considered a software-only
attacker [7, 11,22], and thus a single physically compromised device is sufficient
to reveal the secret shared among all other devices, enabling the attacker to
inject completely fake attestation reports in the network. However, even in the
simplest case, we argue that PADS shows some degree of resiliency with respect
to previous works that made the same assumptions. Intuitively, this is provided
by the combination of the following two properties of PADS: (a) in a generic
setting, information is not processed along a tree; (b) data combination uses a
minimum consensus approach. Property (a) suggests that there will be a certain
degree of redundancy in the propagated information, which every (honest) device
will receive from a non-constant neighborhood of (honest and malicious) devices;
furthermore, Vrf will collect the final result from one or more random provers.
In this case, the dynamic nature of the network topology is a friend of security.
Consider for example the protocol in [7]: here, a single physically compromised
device at a specific position in the spanning tree could “fake” the attestation
report of a whole subtree of devices, even if the devices in the tree are only
software compromised. In PADS, instead, in order to make sure a whole group
of devices can evade detection, the attacker will have to physically compromise all
of them (to be able to have access to the shared key, and craft a bitmask for each).
10 Note that, [22] uses pseudo-random generation of attestation times to tackle mo-
bile attackers compromising a device and then re-establish a correct configuration
between consecutive attestation runs.
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Indeed, due to Property (b), it is unfeasible even for a powerful attacker with
access to the shared secret, to change the value of a software-compromised device
from 00 to 10, if previously “propagated” in the network by honest provers as 00.
This requires a much higher effort for the attacker compared to [7]. Physically
compromised devices have been considered in [5] and [21]. However, as previously
stated, both works are unsuitable for dynamic topologies; furthermore, [5] is quite
costly in terms of required computation (see Section 6).
